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Abstract 
We explore the impact of equity incentives and regional investor protection on 
corporate payout policies and corporate performance. Despite the fact that some 
managers appear to abuse equity incentives by increasing dividend payouts, we 
provide evidence suggesting that regional investor protection can potentially restrain 
such behavior. In all likelihood, the restraining effect depends on the firms’ growth 
opportunities, on the basis of which the effect on cash (stock) dividends is found to be 
weaker (stronger) in high-growth firms – whose ability to pay cash dividends is 
limited by their appetite for cash for expansion – and stronger (weaker) in low-growth 
firms with a lower cash appetite. Further evidence indicates that the restraining effect 
of regional investor protection on selfish dividend-related behavior encouraged by 
equity incentives may also prove valuable in encouraging exploitation of these 
incentives so as to enhance corporate performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Equity incentives can alleviate agency problems but also provide managers with 
a channel to promote their own self-interest, without benefiting shareholders, by 
increasing payouts (Lambert et al. 1989; Jolls 1998; Bartov et al. 1998; Weisbenner 
1998; Fenn & Liang 2001; Kahle 2002). The links between equity incentives and 
 “high sending and transferring chaos”1 in firms’ dividend distributions are well 
documented in the existing literature (see, for instance, Lv et al. 2012; Xiao et al. 
2012; Li et al. 2014; Chen & Guo 2017. In this context, the quality of investor 
protection and corporate governance are also positively related to both corporate 
dividends and corporate performance (La Porta et al. (hereafter LLSV) 2000; 
Kalcheva & Lins 2007; Jiraporn et al. 2011). While both equity incentives and 
investor protection can reduce agency costs, the mechanism through which this is 
manifested is totally different in each case. In the existing literature, the joint effect 
between equity incentives and investor protection on firm payouts and performance – 
especially in the same country, but different regions and under different investor 
protection levels – is totally ignored. In view of the lacuna in the existing literature, 
this paper therefore aims to examine the interaction effects between equity incentives 
and investor protection on corporate payout policy and corporate performance.  
Consistent with previous research including Wang et al. (2008), Shen et al. (2009) 
and Tang & Chen (2010), we utilize an indicator from Fan et al. (2015) China 
Marketization Index. This marketization index consists of five sub-indicators, out of 
which we focus on the fifth, that we believe is closely related to the degree of 
protection given to investors in various regions, and to the variables incorporated in 
this study. We envisage the following channels being captured by this index: the more 
developed are intermediaries in a region, the higher the efficiency of law enforcement; 
and the better the legal environment, the more likely, timely and severe will be the 
punishment imposed by the local authorities for illegal behavior. Firms fearing 
punishment should therefore be more strongly deterred from harming minority 
shareholders’ interests, and thus behave more consistently with those interests, where 
 
1 "High sending and transferring chaos" refers to a large proportion of listed firms sending bonus 
shares or a large proportion of capital reserve funds to increase stocks, such as 10 shares for every 
l0 shares, 5 shares for every 10 shares, or even 30 shares for every 10 shares, and so on. The “high 
sending and transferring” program in the Chinese stock market is “unusually global”, and the 
CSRC has paid close attention to this kind of behavior exhibited by enterprises. The main reason 
is that those firms have no actual performance support, and are just using to carry out the transfer 
of benefits (Li et al. 2014). 
 the legal environment is well developed.  
Our estimates show that, while managers of some firms that have adopted equity 
incentives can abuse them by selfishly increasing dividend payouts, regional investor 
protection can restrain such behavior. Additional analysis suggests that this restraining 
effect depends crucially on firms’ growth opportunities. That is, the effect on cash 
(stock) dividends is weaker (stronger) in high-growth firms – whose ability to pay 
cash dividends is limited by their appetite for cash for expansion – and stronger 
(weaker) in low-growth firms with lower cash appetites. Further evidence indicates 
that the restraining effect of regional investor protection on selfish dividend-related 
behavior encouraged by equity incentives may also prove valuable in encouraging the 
exploitation of these incentives to enhance corporate performance. Our paper 
contributes to the existing literature that touches on the equity incentive effect on firm 
payout policy by exploring the role of investor protection, and the effect that this 
might have on corporate payouts and corporate performance. 
This study focuses on the Chinese market for three main reasons. First, China is 
one of the largest emerging economies in the world, and a place where firms expand 
at a prodigious rate, reaching unprecedented levels of performance. The success of the 
Chinese economy acts as a magnet for international inflows of capital, thus raising 
expectations for future returns. Given the idiosyncratic nature of the Chinese stock 
market, it is also intended that this study will inform potential global investors of the 
inherent functional aspects of the stock market.  
Second, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Database2, China’s 
investor protection is weak. Investor protection, however, varies regionally across the 
31 provinces of mainland China. China Securities Investor Protection Fund 
Corporation’s (SIPF’s)3 2010-2017 Investor Protection Report for Listed Firms in 
China indicates that different levels of investor protection are significantly higher in 
economically developed southeast coastal areas like Guangdong, Zhejiang, and 
Beijing than in less developed western regions, such as Gansu and Tibet, which 
 
2 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/doing-business. 
3 http://www.sipf.com.cn/dcpj/tbzkpj/. 
 ranked the lowest. In China, although all provinces are formally required to 
implement nationally promulgated laws and regulations, in practice the enforcement 
and effect of these legal provisions differs from region to region, depending on 
regional legal environments. Thus, regional levels of investor protection also differ. 
This paper therefore seeks to take advantage of the great disparity in regional levels of 
investor protection across China, by examining whether this has different impacts on 
corporate payout policies and performance than the country-level investor protection 
and firm-level corporate governance factors, which have already been studied in the 
existing literature.  
Thirdly, given that other emerging economies share the same characteristics as 
China, this study can provide a blueprint on how taking effective measures to 
strengthen the regional investor protection level can also promote the development of 
the local economy. In countries where investor protection is weak overall, policies 
designed to improve regional investor protection that improving the efficiency of 
legal systems should remain a priority item on regional policy makers' agendas. 
Because improving regional levels of investor protection would be more feasible and 
effective than reforming the legal mechanisms at a country level. 
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we study the association of the 
interaction between equity incentives and regional investor protection with corporate 
dividends and performance, whereas previous research has mostly studied the impact 
of these items on dividends and performance individually. We find that regional 
investor protection has a restraining effect on self-interested managerial behavior 
encouraged by equity incentives vis a vis dividend policy, and on performance. This 
study thus enriches the extant literature. Second, we use a regional index of investor 
protection to study the impact this factor has on corporate dividends and performance, 
in contrast with most previous studies, which have examined these issues at country 
or individual firm levels. Our index is also different from those adopted in most of the 
earlier research. LLSV's (2000) “Anti-director-rights index” and Djankov et al. (2008) 
“Anti-self-dealing index” mainly reflect the protection of investors in terms of the 
voting rights of majority investors or boards of directors, subscription rights of 
 preferred shares, legal levels of compensation, and private legal enforcement 
mechanisms. By contrast, the regional investor protection index mainly reflects 
protection for investors stemming from the legal system/environment prevailing in 
their region. The use of a regional-level investor protection index in this paper 
therefore fills a gap by coming in between the country- and firm-level indicators 
typically used in previous research, thus providing a new perspective on investor 
protection issues. Third, this paper has important policy implications, since reforming 
investor protection laws and improving judicial quality is difficult and lengthy at a 
country level. Improving regional levels of investor protection, however, seems more 
feasible and effective. Through measures encouraging the development of 
intermediaries, increases in the number of lawyers, improvements in the efficiency of 
law enforcement and so on – all of which seem likely to constrain behavior harmful to 
the interests of investors – the provincial administrations can reasonably expect to 
contribute towards improvements in the performance of firms and the development of 
the economy in their region. We hope this paper provides encouragement to regional 
policy makers, in this regard, in China and in other developing countries where 
investor protection is weak overall. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and section 3 touches on the development of the research questions. 
Section 4 elaborates on the empirical framework of analysis whilst section 5 presents 
and discusses the results. Finally, section 6 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Brief literature review 
2.1 Equity incentives, payouts and corporate performance 
In the extant literature, there is ample evidence to suggest that there is a 
relationship between equity incentives and payouts, with many studies establishing a 
strong negative (positive) influence of executive stock options on dividends 
(repurchases) in US firms (Lambert et al. 1989; Jolls 1998; Bartov et al. 1998; 
Weisbenner 1998; Fenn & Liang 2001; Kahle 2002). In Europe, however, dividend 
protection of stock options is common. Liljeblom & Pasternack (2006), De Cesari & 
 Ozkan (2014) and Burns et al. (2015) find that firms with executive stock options, in 
countries where these are dividend protected, tend to pay higher – not lower – 
dividends, and managers’ total compensation is insignificantly associated with 
repurchases. In China, where options are dividend protected, evidence indicates that 
equity incentive schemes have a positive impact on dividend payouts (Lv et al. 2012; 
Xiao & Yu 2012 ; Chen & Guo 2017).  
Equity incentives have restricted stock and stock options in two main ways. 
Aboody & Kasnik (2008) find that equity incentives in the forms of restricted stock 
and stock options may have different effects on payout policy. They argue that 
individual income tax plays a more important role for dividend-protected restricted 
stock, with managers being interested in improving the dividend payment rate and 
offering more choices of restricted stock.  
Executives can leverage the market’s “price illusion” to gain further benefits 
from stock dividends or splits. McNichols & Dravid (1990), Ikenberry et al. (1996) 
and Desai & Jain (1997) find that, in US stock markets, stock dividends and stock 
splits can bring about long-run abnormal excess returns.  
On the issue of whether equity incentives effect corporate performance,  
Morgan & Poulsen (2001) indicate that the returns on assets of firms introducing 
equity incentives increase after one year, whilst Core & Larcker (2002) and Kato et al. 
(2005) suggest that firms’ operating performance and dividend yields increase 
significantly after the adoption of equity incentive plans. 
2.2 Investor protection, payouts and corporate performance 
LLSV (2000) find that stronger investor protection has a positive influence on 
dividend payouts at a country level. In the same spirit, Kalcheva & Lins (2007) and 
Jiraporn et al. (2011) provide evidence suggesting that the quality of investor 
protection has a significant impact on dividend policy at the individual firm level. 
Klapper & Love (2002) find that firm-level corporate governance matters more in 
countries where shareholder protection is weak and judicial efficiency is poor. 
When considering growth opportunities, LLSV (1997) find that, where investor 
protection is weak, investors are less willing to provide financing. This may pose a 
 problem for high-growth firms in such regions, and firms with high-growth potential, 
which are more likely to need external funds, may pay higher dividends to maintain a 
favorable reputation (Durnev & Kim, 2005). Finally, Lombardo & Pagano, (2000); La 
Porta et al. (1999); Daines, (2001) found that firms’ performance is related to their 
legal environment at international, country and state levels.  
  
 
3. Research question development 
3.1 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and payouts  
In China, options are dividend protected. When Chinese firms distribute cash 
dividends, the exercise prices of their stock options are adjusted according to the 
following formula:  
P = P0 - V  
where P0 is the option exercise price before adjustment, P is the exercise price after 
adjustment, and V is the cash dividend per share. Thus, the distribution of dividends 
does not reduce the value of protected options, and Chinese firms’ executives owning 
dividend-protected options face different incentives regarding profit distribution 
schemes than do the executives of firms in the US.  
Agency theory suggests that those who control firms take into account their own 
interests, as well as those of their principals. Investor protection is therefore necessary 
to protect investors from expropriation by firm insiders. Empirical research indicates 
that, where firms provide equity incentives as part of executive compensation 
packages, executives can maximize their own benefits through manipulation of 
payout policies (Lv et al. 2012; Xiao & Yu 2012; Chen & Guo 2017). Where 
legislation exists to protect minority shareholders, its deterrent effect is dependent on 
both the efficiency of its enforcement and the severity of its penalties. In regions with 
strong investor protection, firms’ executives may be effectively deterred by minority 
shareholder protection legislation; their self-interested use of payout policies may 
therefore be somewhat restricted. Thus, we might expect firms with equity incentive 
schemes, from regions with strong investor protection, to have relatively lower 
dividend payouts. This forms the basis of Hypothesis 1: 
 Regional investor protection has a restricting effect on managers’ tendency to 
raise payouts in the form of cash dividends and buybacks. The stronger the investor 
protection in a region, the lower the propensity for firms offering equity incentives to 
make payouts.  
 
3.2 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and growth opportunities 
 When we take into account the growth opportunities of firms, will this 
restrictive effect of investor protection lead to differentiation in dividend payout 
policies? Will the effects on cash and stock dividends be the same? High-growth 
firms will reduce cash dividends to support their development. Therefore, we suggest 
that the restrictive effect of investor protection on cash dividends will be weaker in 
high-growth firms than in low-growth firms. This is Hypothesis 2a: 
   The restricting effect of investor protection on payouts will differ depending upon 
firms’ growth potential, decreasing where growth potential is stronger, and increasing 
where growth potential is weaker. 
Because stock dividend and stock split behavior convey information regarding 
the optimism of firms’ management – i.e. they are more likely when rapid earnings 
growth and stock price increases are expected – it is argued that the long-run positive 
excess returns for Chinese firms announcing stock dividends, confirm that stock 
dividends serve as a positive signal regarding firms’ prospects.  The greater investors’ 
preference for low unit stock prices, the more managers can increase their firms’ 
market capitalization via stock dividends or splits (Baker et al. 2009). High-growth 
firms thus face incentives to increase stock dividends, leveraging "price illusion" to 
boost market capitalization and managers’ compensation, while low-growth firms do 
not face such strong incentives. Therefore, the restricting effect should be stronger for 
high-growth firms, and weaker for low-growth firms, our Hypothesis 2b: 
The restricting effect of strong investor protection on stock dividends is stronger 
under higher levels of growth potential, and weaker under lower levels of growth 
potential. 
 3.3 Stock options, restricted stock and regional investor protection 
In China, although stock options are dividend protected, and dividends are thus 
reflected in the exercise prices of stock option incentives, executives holding stock 
options rather than restricted shares do not directly receive cash dividends on them. 
By contrast, with restricted stock, cash dividends are paid directly to executives, 
increasing their cash assets. In addition, China's income tax rate on cash dividends is 
far lower than that on gains resulting from the exercise of stock options. So, other 
things being equal, the use of restricted stock can significantly increase firms’ levels 
of cash dividend distribution relative to stock options. However, if the level of 
regional investor protection has a restricting effect on managers' self-interested 
tendency to increase dividends, this might mitigate the differences between firms’ 
cash dividend payout policies in situations where restricted stock equity incentives are 
in place and those where stock option equity incentives are in place.  
The index of regional investor protection we adopt is based on the quantity of 
legal intermediary organizations, and the quality of the legal environment, in different 
Chinese provinces. In any given region, more developed intermediary organizations, 
more efficient law enforcement, and a better legal environment can all act as factors 
deterring firms from harming the interests of shareholders. We therefore speculate 
that the restricting effect of investor protection via deterrence may moderate the 
magnitude of the effect that different forms of equity incentives – stock options versus 
restricted stock – have upon cash dividends. Thus, we propose research Hypothesis 3: 
Use of restricted stock equity incentives results in higher cash dividend payout 
ratios relative to the use of stock options. This difference does not exist in the case of 
stock dividends, and where it exists it is moderated by the restricting effects of strong 
regional investor protection. 
 
3.4 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and corporate performance  
An abundance of studies has investigated the effects of managerial stock 
ownership on firm performance. Research suggests that executive equity incentives 
improve firm performance.  
 Most of the existing literature has used firm-level corporate governance data to 
examine the relationship between investor protection and firm performance (Gompers 
et al. 2003; Klapper & Love, 2002). We therefore speculate that the regional-level 
quality of investor protection may have an impact on corporate performance, similar 
to those of the country-level quality of investor protection and corporate governance 
at the individual firm level. By restricting self-interested dividend-payout-related 
behavior among managers, higher levels of regional investor protection may permit 
fuller exploitation of the synergy effects of equity incentives to motivate managers to 
work more effectively and improve corporate performance. Therefore, we propose 
research Hypothesis 4: 
Regional investor protection may improve corporate performance via its 
restricting effects on self-interested behavior resulting from the use of equity 
incentives. 
 
4. Empirical investigation   
We obtained data on firms’ equity incentives, payouts, cash/stock dividend dates 
and stock prices from CSMAR, a leading business data and information service 
company. We also collected most of the required firm characteristics from CSMAR, 
except for the institutional investor shareholding ratio, which we downloaded from 
the WIND database, excluding observations with invalid data. To build the additional 
variables, we complemented this dataset with market and accounting data from the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites.   
We collated data for the regional investor protection index (IPI) from the China 
Marketization Index Report. We imputed values for years with missing data (2013, 
2016 and 2017) by means of linear interpolation or a linear trend extrapolation. We 
determined the number of lawyers in each province in China, by hand, from the 
Chinese Yearbook of Lawyers4 (2006-2017). 
In order to deal with possible endogeneity in terms of the impact of equity 
 
4 Data may be downloaded from: http://www.tjcn.org/tjnj/lll/ 
 incentives on payout policies and corporate performance, we use only the lagged 
values of the independent variable. Consistent with previous studies, we also exclude 
firms from the financial services and utilities sectors, since regulatory rules and 
restrictions can influence the payout policies of firms in those industries. We 
winsorize all payout and control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Our final 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel, with 2776 firms and 24724 firm-year 
observations.  
 
 
4.1 Variables and descriptive statistics 
4.1.1 Payout, performance, investor protection and control variables 
The dependent variables reflect cash dividends, stock dividends and corporate 
performance. Our primary measures of firm payouts are the cash dividend to assets 
ratio, and the stock dividend to asset ratio. For robustness, we also use an additional 
proxy i.e. dividend yield (payout ratio) which is dividend scaled by stock price 
(earnings). Follow prior literatures, we measure corporate performance using 
profitability: firms’ EBITDA to assets ratios (or return on assets - ROA); Tobin's Q: 
the market capitalization of the firm's stock plus debt, divided by total assets. We 
encode equity incentives as a dummy variable, assigning one for non-zero incentives, 
and zero for zero incentives. We similarly encode stock options as a dummy variable: 
one for a stock option scheme, and zero otherwise.  
For the regional IPI, we adopt the fifth component of the China Marketization 
Index, which is designed to capture the "development of market intermediaries and 
the legal system/environment". Yu & Pan (2008) and Pan et al. (2009) find that the 
ratio of the number of lawyers to the local population reflects the efficiency of law 
enforcement in different regions. We also used (the logarithm of) the number of 
lawyers in each province each year as a substitute IPI, to check the robustness of our 
regressions to the measure of investor protection, which is critical to our main 
hypotheses.  
Given that, in the extant empirical literature, there is a relationship between 
 payouts and a variety of firm characteristics, we include as independent control 
variables in our regression equations, firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, 
cash holdings, leverage, risk, firm age, retained earnings, and institutional ownership. 
Fama & French (2001) find that firm size, as measured by the logarithm of assets, is 
positively related to payout. We thus include a measure of firm size, the logarithm of 
assets (Log Assets), in our regression equations. Firms with higher profitability tend 
to have more free cash flow available to finance payouts (Aboody & Kasnik 2008). 
We thus include a measure of profitability, ROA, as defined above. We also include a 
proxy for growth opportunities, Tobin's Q, as defined above. It seems likely that cash 
holdings may also have an important influence on payout policy. We thus include the 
ratio of cash holdings to total assets (Cash Ratio). Since Jensen (1986) contends that 
higher debt reduces free cash flows, reducing the cash available to be paid out to 
shareholders, we include the Debt Ratio (total debt divided by assets). Kahle (2002) 
suggests that riskier firms tend to avoid paying large dividends, preferring instead to 
use repurchases as a way of returning free cash flow to investors. In view of the latter, 
we incorporate a measure of risk, the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 
fiscal year (SD Return). In view of DeAngelo et al.(2006) findings i.e. that firm’s life 
cycle may affect its payouts, we also add age of firm (Age) and Retained Earnings as 
control variables. Institutional ownership has also been shown to be positively related 
to payout policy, for two possible reasons, according to Short et al. (2002): First, 
institutions may demand high levels of dividends to force firms to seek external 
funding and hence subject themselves to more rigorous external monitoring. Second, 
institutional shareholders may counter management’s tendency to retain excess free 
cash flow. We thus include the percentage of institutional ownership (Inst % Owned) 
as an independent variable. 
Table 1 contains a summary of the definitions of payout, corporate performance, 
regional investor protection and the control variables used in our empirical analysis. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics  
 Table 2 lists the number of firms in each province by year.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Following Guariglia & Yang (2016), we divide the 31 provinces into three regions: 
coastal, central and western. The eastern coastal provinces include Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang, Hebei, Hainan, Fujian, Liaoning, Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Tianjin, the most economically developed provinces in China, which together account 
for over 66.9% of all the listed firms in the dataset at the end of 2017. The central 
region includes Jilin, Anhui, Shanxi, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Heilongjiang, and 
Chongqing, accounting for 18.1% of the listed firms. The western region includes 
Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Ningxia, Guangxi, Xinjiang, Gansu, Tibet, 
Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Qinghai, accounting for the final 15% of the listed firms. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the regional IPI, which we classify into four 
categories: IPI≥10 is defined as strong, 10>IPI≥6 as relatively strong, 6>IPI≥3 as 
general, and IPI<3 as weak investor protection. In terms of distribution, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Beijing are the areas with strong investor protection; 
Guangdong, Fujian, Anhui, Shandong, Sichuan, and Chongqing those with relatively 
strong investor protection; Guangxi, Yunnan, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Henan, Hebei, 
Shanxi, Shaanxi, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang those with general 
investor protection; and finally, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Hainan those with weak investor protection. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for variables used in our estimates. Panel A 
focuses on the payout and incentive variables of the entire dataset, giving the number 
 of observations, mean, median, and standard deviation. Average cash and stock 
dividend payouts are 1.06% and 0.34% of assets respectively. The mean value for  
Payout ratio is 1% on stock price. 13.1% of firms in our sample used equity incentive 
schemes of any form between 2006 and 2017. Panel B reports these statistics for the 
subset of firms that used equity incentive schemes, for which options and restricted 
stock represent 1.26% and 0.59% of total assets on average, while payout ratio is 0.9% 
on average. In this equity incentive subsample, 41.9% of firms used stock options, 
while 58.1% used restricted stock.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the firm characteristics. In our full 
sample, the mean Cash Ratio is 18.9% of assets, mean Log Assets are 21.89 RMB, 
and the mean Debt Ratio is 45.3%. The mean values for Tobin’s Q and ROA are 2.56% 
and 3.7%, respectively.  The average institutional ownership of firms in our sample 
is 33.5%. The average age of firm is 10.28 years old. The mean values for retained 
earning is 0.11. In our equity incentives subsample, the mean Cash Ratio is 20% of 
assets, slightly higher than that for the complete sample. The mean values of Tobin’s 
Q and ROA are also higher than in the complete sample, by 0.57 and 1.7 percentage 
points, respectively. The mean Debt Ratio is 39%, 6.3 percentage points lower than in 
the complete dataset. Average institutional ownership of firms in the equity incentives 
subsample is 32.1%, 1.4 percentage points lower than in the complete dataset. 
Average age of firm is 8.05 and 2.23 year shorter than in the complete sample. The 
mean values for retained earnings is 0.197 and 8.7 percentage points higher than in 
the complete sample. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Figure 2 illustrates trends in the firms’ adoption of stock option and restricted 
stock incentive schemes over 2006-2017. In 2010, nearly 70% of equity incentives 
 were in the form of stock options, with the balance gradually shifting to restricted 
stock, which became prevalent by around 2014. By 2017, restricted stock was 
dominant, accounting for over 70% of equity incentives, while less than 30% of firms 
were using stock options.  
 
 
 
 
5. Empirical results  
We examine the relationship between incentives and regional investor protection 
in influencing payouts and corporate performance, in a framework controlling for 
firm-specific effects and regional measures. In all specifications, we report a White 
heteroskedastic-consistent estimator, adjusted for clustering at the firm level 
(Andrews 1991; Zeileis 2004), and include year, industry, firm and region fixed 
effects. Clustering standard errors by firm and including year fixed effects minimizes 
bias in standard errors due to firm and time effects (Petersen 2009). We use the 
following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model:  
 Payout',)*+ = -. + -+012314563',) + -7080) + -9012314563',) × 080)+ -;<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D',) + E3C>' + F) + ε',) 
                                                                     (1) 
Here, subscripts i and t index firm and year respectively. Our payout measure is either 
cash or stock dividends (divided by the total book value of assets). Our equity 
incentive measure (Incentive) is equity incentives or its separate components – 
options and restricted stock, once again divided by total assets – in the year prior to 
the payout. Our regional IPI measure is a score representing market intermediaries 
and the legal environment in each region. Firm characteristics include Log Assets, 
Debt Ratio, Cash Ratio, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Inst % Owned, and SD Return, Age, 
Retained earnings, each measured in the year prior to the payout. 
 
5.1 Evidence of interaction between equity incentives’ and regional investor 
protection’s effects on payouts  
In order to examine interactions between the effects of equity incentives and 
 regional investor protection upon firms’ cash or stock dividend payouts, we run the 
following regressions: 
 Cash')*+ = -. + -+012314563') + -7080) + -9012314563') × 080)+ -;<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
(2) Stock')*+ = -. + -+012314563') + -7080) + -9012314563') × 080)+ -;<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
 (3) 
Here, all variables are defined as in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 5 presents the results of these regressions. Columns (1)-(3) estimate the 
probability that firms pay cash dividends, with cash dividend payouts as the 
dependent variable. Each model includes equity incentives as the independent 
variable of primary interest, and investor protection as a further explanatory variable. 
In column (1), we control for region, industry and year effects, yielding a coefficient 
on Incentive of 0.058, with a p-value significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
equity incentives tend to increase the proportion of firms paying cash dividends, 
consistent with previous findings in the classic literature. In column (2), controlling 
only for firm and year effects, the coefficient on Incentive is 0.171, significant at the 5% 
level. Meanwhile, the coefficient on regional IPI is -0.012, significant at the 10% 
level. The coefficient on the interaction between equity incentives and regional 
investor protection (EI*IPI), although smaller at -0.024, is significant at the 1% level. 
In column (3), with fixed effects for region, industry and year once again, the 
coefficients on Incentive and IPI are 0.103 and 0.009, respectively, both insignificant, 
suggesting that these variables have less impact on the cash dividend policy after 
controlling for region. Meanwhile, however, the coefficient on the interaction 
between equity incentives and regional investor protection (Incentive*IPI) is -0.016, 
significant at the 5% level. This implies a 1.6% decrease in the cash-dividend-paying 
proportion of firms for every 1% increase in regional investor protection where firms 
 have adopted equity incentives. Columns (4) through (6) repeat these regressions, but 
use stock dividends as the dependent variable. In column (6), the coefficient on 
Incentive is 0.199, significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on IPI is far smaller, at 
-0.001, and not significant. However, the interaction coefficient between equity 
incentives and regional investor protection (Incentive*IPI) is far larger (-0.013) and 
significant at the 5% level: where firms have adopted equity incentives, a 1% increase 
in regional investor protection is associated with a 1.3% decrease in the 
stock-dividend-paying proportion of firms. We thus conclude that strengthened 
regional investor protection reduces the proportion of both cash and stock dividend 
payouts: in terms of both statistical and economic significance, regional investor 
protection restrains the self-interested motivation – created by equity incentives – for 
management to set high levels of dividend payouts. Further, the higher the degree of 
regional investor protection, the larger the magnitude of this restraining effect. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Our results are thus consistent with previous evidence that equity incentives have 
positive effects on cash and stock dividends (repurchases) if they are dividend 
protected (Liljeblom & Pasternack 2006; De Cesari & Ozkan 2014; Burns et al. 2015; 
Xiao & Yu 2012; Chen & Guo 2017). However, the fact that higher levels of regional 
investor protection are not associated with higher dividend payouts in our framework 
suggests that the regional IPI we have used is inconsistent with the country-level 
index adopted by LLSV (2000), and the individual firm-level indices used by 
Kalcheva & Lins (2007) and Jiraporn et al. (2011). This might be due to the fact that 
the regional IPI reflects the efficiency of law enforcement and the law enforcement 
environment, and thus mainly reduces firms' behavior inimical to the interests of 
minority shareholders through a deterrence effect.  
With respect to the control variables, our results show more profitable firms are 
more likely to pay cash and stock dividends, a result consistent with Aboody & 
Kasnik (2008). Those with higher leverage are less likely to pay cash dividends, and 
pay smaller stock dividends, consistent with Kahle (2002). Firms with greater risk 
tend to pay lower cash dividends but risk has a significantly positive impact on stock 
 dividends, consistent with Kahle’s (2002) conclusion that riskier firms tend to favor 
repurchases over cash dividends as a way of paying out free cash flow to investors. In 
our results, larger firms are less likely pay cash and stock dividends, a finding 
inconsistent with both Fama & French (2001) and Burns et al. (2015). This may stem 
from differences between capital market participants in China and those in more 
advanced economies, like the US and OECD countries; further research will be 
necessary for a deeper understanding of this point. Columns (1)-(6) all show a 
significantly positive relationship between cash holdings and the likelihood of 
dividend payouts. This is consistent with Jensen (1986), but inconsistent with Opler et 
al. (1999), Almeida et al. (2004) and Boyle & Guthrie (2003), who all argue that, 
possibly due to precautionary demands, firms with a greater need to hold cash 
balances are less likely to pay out dividends. Institutional ownership is associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of a firm paying both cash and stock dividends, 
consistent with Short et al. (2002).  Our results show retained earnings is significant 
and positively correlated to both cash and stock dividends, while firm age has a 
negative impact on the propensity of payouts, which is consistent with DeAngelo et 
al.(2006).  
 
 
5.2 Dividends, regional investor protection and growth opportunities 
To explore whether the joint effects of equity incentives and regional investor 
protection on payouts are altered in the presence of growth opportunities, we run the 
following regression: 
 N565O31O')*+ = -. + -+012314563') + -9P5Qℎ	R) + -9080) + -9012314563') × P5Qℎ	R) +-9080) × P5Qℎ	R) + -9012314563') × 080) + -9012314563') × P5Qℎ	R) × 080) +-S<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε')          (4)                                             
 
Here, dividends are either cash or stock dividends, scaled by assets. The High Q 
includes firms with Tobin’s Q scores above the average level, based on year and 
province; Low Q includes those with scores below the average. Equity incentives 
 (Incentive), regional investor protection (IPI) and the control variables (Firm 
Characteristics) are as defined in Table 1. The results are shown in Table 6.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 6 Panel A presents the results of regressions in which cash dividends are 
the dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) give the results for the subsample of 
low-growth firms, columns (3) and (4) those for the high-growth firms. In column (1), 
firm and year are treated as fixed effects; region, industry and year are treated as fixed 
effects in column (2). The results show that the coefficients for equity incentives 
(Incentive) and regional investor protection (IPI) are significant at the 5% level in the 
low-growth subsample; the coefficient on their interaction (Incentive*IPI) is 
significant at the 1% level. However, these coefficients are not significant in the 
high-growth subsample, suggesting that, when faced with growth opportunities, 
managers’ interests are best served by limiting cash dividend payouts and retaining 
cash to fund firms’ development – an observation novel to the existing literature. 
Columns (1) and (2) show that equity incentives and regional investor protection 
(Incentive*IPI) jointly have a very significant negative correlation with cash 
dividends at low growth levels, while there is no significant correlation in the 
high-growth subsample. This suggests that low-growth firms’ managers have a 
tendency to pay out high cash dividends, but that regional investor protection has a 
strong restricting effect on this self-interested behavior. The interaction coefficient 
implies that, for every percentage point increase in the regional IPI, the cash dividend 
payout proportion decreases by 2.2%, supporting Hypothesis 2A. 
Table 6 Panel B presents the results of regressions in which stock dividends are 
the dependent variable. Based on these, the independent variables’ effects on stock 
and cash dividends are complete opposites. Equity incentives (Incentive) and their 
interaction with regional investor protection (Incentive*IPI) are significant in the 
high-growth subsample, at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, even though regional 
investor protection (IPI) is less significant, and not significant at all in the low-growth 
 subsample. A one percentage point increase in regional investor protection is 
associated with a 1.7% reduction in stock dividends. This result suggests that 
managers in firms with good growth opportunities are more inclined to increase stock 
dividends. There are several possible explanations for this: managers may be using 
stock dividends as a mechanism for signaling positive information to the capital 
market, which then has further beneficial effects on their firms’ ability to raise 
external funds. Alternatively, they may be using “price illusion” to maximize market 
capitalization (and thus their own interests). The results indicate that regional investor 
protection can constrain this behavior, supporting Hypothesis 2B. 
When we take growth opportunities into account, the restraining effects of 
regional investor protection on managers' self-interested use of equity incentives is 
polarized, and depends on the form of dividend distribution. For cash dividends, this 
restraint decreases (increases) as firm growth potential increases (decreases). For 
stock dividends, the restraining effect increases (decreases) with increasing 
(decreasing) firm growth potential. 
 
5.3 Stock options, restricted stock and regional investor protection 
We run regressions including payout measures for firms using stock options and 
restricted stock, to examine the differential effects of these two forms of equity 
incentives on dividend payouts under different levels of regional investor protection: 
 ACDℎO565O31OD')*+= -. + -+TU45T1) + -9080) + -9TU45T1) × 080)+ -S<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
(5) V4T2WO565O31OD')*+= -. + -+TU45T1) + -9080) + -9TU45T1) × 080)+ -S<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
(6) ACDℎO565O31OD')*+= -. + -+>3D4>5243O) + -9080) + -9>3D4>5243O) × 080)+ -S<+;=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
(7) 
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(8) 
 
Here, cash dividends is cash distributions scaled by assets, stock dividends is stock 
dividends scaled by assets, and stock options is a dummy variable equal to one for 
stock option equity incentive schemes, and zero otherwise. The variable representing 
the level of regional investor protection (IPI), and other control variables, are as 
defined in Table 1.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 7 shows the regression results. Columns (1)-(3) use cash dividends as the 
dependent variable. In columns (1) and (3), region, industry and year are treated as 
fixed effects, while in column (2) only firm and year are treated as fixed effects. In 
column (1), the regression coefficient for the stock options variable is -0.146, a 
negative correlation significant at the 5% level, indicating that the cash dividend ratio 
associated with stock options is lower than that for restricted stocks, consistent with 
Aboody & Kasnik (2008) and Chen & Guo (2017). Columns (2) and (3) show the 
interaction effects between stock options (option) and regional investor protection 
(IPI): for cash dividends, the regression coefficient for stock options is -0.456, once 
again negative, and here significant at the 1% level. The regression coefficient for IPI 
is 0.033 – not significant – but the coefficient on the interaction of the two (option*IPI) 
is 0.03, a positive correlation significant at the 10% level. Figure 1, above, showed 
that managers of Chinese firms are increasingly likely to use restricted stocks as 
equity incentives. The reason is obvious: the use of restricted stock, combined with 
payments of higher cash dividends, allows them to directly increase their own cash 
assets more quickly than the use of stock options. The degree of protection of regional 
investors also has a restraining effect on this self-interested behavior. Every 
percentage point increase in the regional investor protection index is associated with a 
 reduction in the difference in cash dividends between firms using restricted stock and 
those using stock option equity incentives, of 3%. Columns (4)-(6) show the results 
when using stock dividends as the dependent variable. Here, the coefficients on stock 
options (option), regional investor protection (IPI), and their interaction (option*IPI) 
are not significant. Nor is there a significant difference between the effects of 
restricted stocks and stock options on stock dividends. We surmise that the main 
reason for this is that stock dividends do not immediately satisfy managers’ interests 
and thus are not within the scope of their self-interested motivation. 
Overall, the cash dividend ratio for firms using restricted stock equity incentives 
is higher than that for those using stock options – a tendency which regional investor 
protection can reduce – but this phenomenon is not significant with respect to stock 
dividend distributions. This result is therefore consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
 
5.4 Equity incentives, regional investor protection and corporate performance 
In order to better understand the effects of interactions between equity incentives 
and regional investor protection on corporate performance, we run the following 
regressions: 
 XYZ')*+ = -. + -+012314563') + -7080) + -9012314563') × 080)+ -;<+9=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
                                                                               (9) [T\51]DR')*+ = -. + -+012314563') + -7080) + -9012314563') × 080)+ -;<+9=5>?	AℎC>C243>5D452D') + E3C>' + F) + ε') 
                                                     (10) 
Here, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Incentives, IPI and other control variables are as defined in 
Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 8 presents the results. In the first three columns, ROA is the dependent 
variable. In columns (1) and (3), we treat region, industry and year as fixed effects, 
while in column (2), we treat firm and year as fixed effects. In column (1), the 
coefficient for equity incentives (Incentive) is 0.012 – a positive correlation 
 significant at the 1% level – suggesting that equity incentives tend to improve ROA, 
which is consistent with the classical literature. In column (3), taking the interaction 
effect into account, the coefficients of Incentive and IPI are 0.003 and 0.001 
respectively, and not statistically significant, but the coefficient on the interaction of 
the two (Incentive*IPI) is 0.001, significant at the 10% level and positive. This 
indicates that regional investor protection can act in synergy with equity incentives, 
allowing them to play a positive role in improving firms’ ROA. In columns (4)-(6), Q 
is the dependent variable. In column (4) the coefficient on Incentive is 0.445 – 
positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that equity incentives can 
promote corporate growth. This conclusion is consistent with the existing literature. In 
column (6), the coefficients on Incentive, IPI and their joint effect (Incentive*IPI) are 
0.202, 0.026 and 0.024, respectively – positive correlations significant at the 5%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. This suggests that equity incentives and regional investor 
protection can individually promote firms’ growth, and the combination of the two is 
most effective of all. 
In sum, these regression results are consistent with our contention that regional 
investor protection can improve firms’ ROA and Tobin’s Q ratios by exerting 
restraining effects on the self-interested behavior that equity incentives encourage 
among managers with respect to dividend payout policies. This synergistic effect 
allows equity incentives to be given full play, improving firms’ performance overall, 
consistent with our fourth hypothesis.    
 
5.5 Robustness  
This subsection briefly describes the results of some robustness checks we 
performed on our findings. Referring to the previous literature, we ran regressions 
replacing our preferred measure of cash dividends with payout ratio (cash dividend 
scaled by stock price and multiplied by 100), and replacing our preferred measure of 
regional investor protection (“market intermediaries and legal system/environment” 
with a simpler measure, the natural logarithm of the number of lawyers in each 
province, because the number of lawyers in a region is also a reflection of that 
 region’s law enforcement environment, and the efficiency of enforcement in China. 
The results from these robustness tests support the contention that the main models 
established in this paper are robust, and the conclusions drawn from them reliable
（due to space limitations, we do not list the robust results）. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper uses the fifth component from Fan et al. (2015) China Marketization 
Index – legal intermediaries and law enforcement environment – as an index of 
regional investor protection, in combination with panel data on Chinese firms for 
2006-2017, to explore the joint effect of equity incentives and regional investor 
protection on corporate dividend policy and corporate performance in China, where 
equity incentives are generally dividend protected. The results suggest that the 
managers of firms adopting equity incentives tend to act in their own interests, 
increasing their cash receipts by increasing dividend distributions, as measured by 
cash dividend payout ratios. This conclusion is consistent with previous findings in 
the classic literature on American, European and Chinese firms. By analyzing the 
interaction between equity incentives and regional investor protection, we find that 
regional investor protection has a significant restraining effect on this self-interested 
behavior. The stronger the degree of regional investor protection, the greater this 
effect.  
Incorporating factors reflecting growth in the model equations, we find that the 
restraining effect is different depending on firms’ growth opportunities. The 
restraining effect on cash dividends is significant for low-growth firms. Conversely, 
the restraining effect on stock dividends is significant in high-growth firms. In firms 
adopting restricted stock equity incentives, cash dividends tend to be higher than in 
firms adopting stock options – a disparity not apparent for stock dividends. The 
results suggest that regional investor protection could also restrain this tendency, 
reducing the difference between cash dividend payouts in restricted stock versus stock 
option firms. Finally, our results suggest that this restraining effect can have a positive 
 effect on corporate growth and performance. 
These results have important policy implications. The task of reforming investor 
protection laws and improving judicial quality can be difficult and lengthy, and 
require support from politicians and other interest groups. Compared with the reform 
of legal mechanisms at the country level, improving regional levels of investor 
protection would seem to be more feasible and effective. Our paper therefore suggests 
that, in countries where investor protection is weak overall, policies designed to 
improve regional investor protection, via improvements in regional legal 
environments, could be adopted, and that improving the efficiency of legal systems 
should remain a priority item on regional policy makers' agendas – both in China and 
elsewhere. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition  
Cash Dividends Ratio of total cash dividends paid out in the fiscal year to the         
book value of the firm’s total assets 
Payout ratio Cash dividend scaled by stock price and multiplied by 100 
Stock Dividends  Ratio of total value of stock dividends (repurchases and reserve 
transfers) paid out in the fiscal year to the book value of total assets. 
 The total value is estimated as the number of stocks repurchased or 
involved in reserve transfers, multiplied by the closing price on the 
announcement or transfer date. 
Equity Incentives 
(Dummy) 
1 for non-zero equity incentives and 0 otherwise 
Stock Options (Dummy) 1 for stock options 0 otherwise 
IPI Fifth indicator of regional degree of investor protection from China 
Marketization Index (Fan et al., 2015): "the development of market 
intermediaries and legal system/environment" 
NUM Logarithm of number of lawyers in a province reported in Chinese 
Yearbook of Lawyers (2006-2017) 
Log Assets Logarithm of firm assets 
Debt Ratio Firm total debt divided by assets 
Tobin’s Q Firm's market capitalization plus debt, divided by total assets 
High Q (Dummy) 1 if firm’s Tobin’s Q score is greater than the average based on year 
and province, and 0 otherwise 
ROA Ratio of firm’s Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and 
Amortization (EBITDA) to total assets 
SD Return Standard deviation of monthly returns on a firm’s stock over the 
fiscal year 
Cash Ratio Ratio of firm’s cash to total assets 
Inst % Owned Percentage of firm's stock in issue held by institutions 
Age  firm age 
Retained earning retained earning scaled total asset 
 
 Table 2: Geographical Distribution of Observations 
Table 2 reports the distribution of firms in the sample, by province, annually over 2006–2017. 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 total 
Anhui  45 47 53 55 66 75 77 78 73 79 83 85 816 
Beijing  79 83 91 103 160 191 218 211 224 245 258 262 2,125 
Fujian  47 45 55 58 55 67 75 74 73 80 90 93 812 
Gansu  18 17 20 20 17 19 20 21 22 21 25 26 246 
Guangdong  138 149 176 189 246 302 338 335 343 381 416 425 3,438 
Guangxi  20 22 24 23 23 25 28 29 26 32 35 31 318 
Guizhou  19 19 19 19 21 23 23 24 24 24 27 27 269 
Hainan  21 20 21 22 21 24 23 25 24 23 27 26 277 
Hebai  30 29 32 33 37 44 46 46 45 47 48 48 485 
Henan  28 33 37 39 48 57 63 62 59 68 67 68 629 
Heilong  24 24 24 25 23 24 26 25 22 26 28 28 299 
Hubei  56 54 57 60 67 73 78 78 76 78 86 83 846 
Hunan  35 37 41 45 48 58 64 63 65 72 74 72 674 
Jilin  29 28 31 32 35 40 38 40 41 40 42 41 437 
Jiangsu  86 103 113 116 150 195 226 221 229 237 273 288 2,237 
Jiangxi  23 24 25 24 29 30 32 32 31 33 34 35 352 
Liaonin  46 43 48 51 48 53 58 57 57 65 62 60 648 
Inner Mongolia 18 19 19 19 23 25 27 27 24 24 25 24 274 
Ningxia  11 8 11 11 13 13 13 12 12 13 13 12 142 
Qinghai  8 9 9 9 9 9 10 9 10 9 11 11 113 
Shandong  71 78 89 92 118 140 148 149 143 152 162 157 1,499 
Shanxi  26 25 26 26 30 30 31 32 33 35 36 34 364 
Shaanxi  22 24 26 27 32 33 35 33 35 35 39 37 378 
 Shanghai  120 122 130 134 168 192 205 200 203 218 236 237 2,165 
Sichuan  58 56 65 70 80 83 91 89 92 99 105 105 993 
Tianjin  23 27 27 28 33 37 38 38 39 40 40 45 415 
Tibet  8 7 8 9 8 8 8 9 8 9 11 13 106 
Xinjiang  26 28 31 30 35 37 38 39 36 38 44 44 426 
Yunnan  22 23 25 25 29 30 29 30 30 29 32 28 332 
Zhejiang  86 104 119 127 155 189 217 212 220 245 273 291 2,238 
Chongqing 26 23 24 28 26 30 32 34 35 36 40 37 371 
Total 1,269 1,330 1,476 1,549 1,853 2,156 2,355 2,334 2,354 2,533 2,742 2,773 24,724 
 
 Table 3: Characteristics of Payouts and Incentives 
Table 3 reports summary statistics (number of observations, mean, median, and standard deviation) for the payout 
and incentive variables used in our estimations. Panel A reports them for the entire dataset. Panel B reports them 
for the subsample of observations with non-zero incentives.  
Panel A: Characteristics of payouts and incentives for whole dataset 
 obs  mean median Std.dev 
Cash Dividend to Assets  24,724 1.062% 0.422% 1.592 
Payout ratio 24,724 1.0% 0.7% 0.010 
Stock Dividend(Repurchase and Reserve Transfer) to Assets  24,724 0.342% 0.000% 1.070 
Equity Incentives 24,724 13.1% 0.000% 0.337 
Panel B: Characteristics of payouts and incentives for equity incentives subsample 
 obs  mean median Std.dev 
Cash Dividend to Assets  3,241 1.265% 0.723% 1.687 
Payout ratio 3,241 0.9% 0.6% 0.009 
Stock Dividend(Repurchase and Reserve Transfer) to Assets  3,241 0.598% 0.000% 1.449 
Stock options 3,241 41.9% 0.000 0.494 
 
Table 4: Analysis of Firm Characteristics 
Table 4 provides summary statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for firm characteristics, Panel A 
reporting them for the full dataset, and Panel B for the equity incentives subsample. 
Panel A: Full dataset 
 obs mean median Std.dev 
Cash Ratio 24,724 18.9% 14.7% 0.144 
Log Assets 24,724 21.897 21.743 1.292 
Debt Ratio 24,724 45.3% 44.8% 0.232 
Tobin’s Q 24,724 2.567 1.821 2.483 
ROA 24,724 3.7% 3.6% 0.580 
SD Return 24,724 14.5% 12.8% 0.074 
Inst % Owned 24,724 33.5% 31.6% 0.243 
Age  24,724 10.28 10.00 6.41 
Retained earning 24,724 0.11 0.28 0.14 
Panel B: Equity incentives subsample 
 obs mean median Std.dev 
Cash Ratio 3,241 20.0% 16.0% 0.134 
Log assets 3,241 22.097 21.952 1.150 
Debt ratio 3,241 39.0% 38.1% 0.192 
Q 3,241 3.145 2.420 2.551 
ROA 3,241 5.4% 5.0% 0.049 
SD Return 3,241 14.1% 12.4% 0.077 
Inst % Owned 3,241 32.1% 28.4% 0.248 
Age  3,241 8.053 7.000 5.511 
 Retained earning 3,241 0.197 0.185 0.116 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Regional IPI Distribution (2006-2017) 
 
 
Figure 2: Equity Incentives Subsample: Proportion of Firms using Stock Options and 
Restricted Stock (2006-2017) 
  
 
 
Table 5: Analysis of Cash and Stock Dividend Payouts 
Table 5 reports coefficients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variables 
were the ratios of cash or stock dividends to total assets. We used robust standard 
errors clustered by firm, and included fixed effects for region, industry and year. IPI 
measures province-level investor protection, based on scores for “market 
intermediaries and legal system/environment”. All other variables are as defined in 
Table 1. 
 Cash dividend Stock dividend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentive 0.083*** 0.264*** 0.074 0.061** 0.169** 0.186*** 
 (2.77) (3.39) (1.02) (2.31) (2.39) (2.93) 
Incentive*IPI  -0.024*** -0.016**  -0.017*** -0.013** 
  (-3.37) (-2.36)  (-2.58) (-2.16) 
IPI  0.003 -0.005  -0.003 0.002 
  (0.57) (-0.76)  (-0.55) (0.32) 
Log Assets -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.064*** -0.071*** -0.042** -0.071*** 
 (-5.06) (-2.75) (-5.03) (-6.20) (-2.49) (-6.20) 
Debt Ratio -0.519*** -0.527*** -0.518*** -0.176*** -0.190*** -0.176*** 
 (-7.97) (-7.23) (-7.96) (-3.08) (-2.88) (-3.06) 
ROA 7.397*** 6.192*** 7.400*** 1.688*** 1.426*** 1.689*** 
 (43.15) (35.37) (43.17) (11.26) (8.99) (11.27) 
SD Return -0.604*** -0.412*** -0.601*** 1.244*** 1.000*** 1.244*** 
 (-4.68) (-3.04) (-4.65) (11.02) (8.14) (11.01) 
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
restricted stock stock option
 Cash Ratio 1.674*** 1.738*** 1.665*** 1.107*** 1.172*** 1.103*** 
 (22.58) (21.75) (22.43) (17.01) (16.18) (16.92) 
Inst% Owned 0.386*** 0.102** 0.384*** 0.331*** 0.470*** 0.330*** 
 (8.87) (2.18) (8.83) (8.68) (11.07) (8.66) 
Age  -0.060*** -0.127*** -0.060*** -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.036*** 
 (-23.91) (-25.71) (-23.87) (-15.82) (-5.96) (-15.81) 
Retained earning 0.271*** 0.195*** 0.269*** 0.085* 0.024 0.084* 
 (5.11) (3.20) (5.08) (1.83) (0.43) (1.80) 
constant 2.653*** 2.710*** 2.665*** 1.640*** 1.033*** 1.627*** 
 (8.82) (6.99) (8.83) (6.10) (2.94) (6.03) 
Firm FE No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  
Region FE Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
N 24724 24724 24724 24724 24724 24724 
R-squared 0.3283 0.2269 0.3284 0.1716  0.1483  0.1715 
t statistics in parentheses; (***, **, and *) indicate 1, 5, and 10% significance levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Analysis of Dividends, Regional Investor Protection and Growth 
Opportunities 
Table 6 reports coefficients from OLS regressions in which the ratios of cash and 
stock dividends to total assets are the dependent variables. We use robust standard 
errors clustered by firm, and include region, industry and year fixed effects. Columns 
(1) and (2) use the “Low Q” subsample (Tobin’s Q below the average) based on year 
and province). Columns (3) and (4) use the “High Q” subsample (Tobin’s Q above 
average). IPI measures province-level investor protection based on scores for “market 
intermediaries and legal system/environment”. All other variables are as defined in 
Table 1.  
Panel A: Cash dividend as dependent variable 
 Low Q High Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Incentive 0.362*** 0.180** -0.017 -0.243* 
 (4.28) (2.36) (-0.10) (-1.67) 
Incentive*IPI -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.001 0.005 
 (-3.39) (-3.38) (-0.06) (0.35) 
IPI -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.21) (0.15) (-0.04) (-0.03) 
Log Assets -0.057*** -0.063*** -0.042 0.055* 
  (-2.83) (-4.84) (-0.85) (1.94) 
Debt Ratio -0.846*** -0.756*** -0.241 -0.375*** 
 (-9.12) (-9.74) (-1.55) (-3.01) 
ROA 6.633*** 7.464*** 4.533*** 7.395*** 
 (31.28) (36.52) (12.71) (22.75) 
SD Return -0.268 -0.253 -0.495* -0.984*** 
 (-1.59) (-1.55) (-1.88) (-4.33) 
Cash Ratio 1.466*** 1.329*** 1.571*** 1.519*** 
 (14.55) (15.19) (9.98) (11.43) 
Inst % Owned 0.124** 0.391*** 0.068 0.541*** 
 (2.55) (8.78) (0.58) (5.71) 
Age  -0.099*** -0.046*** -0.217*** -0.064*** 
 (-20.53) (-18.31) (-12.89) (-14.33) 
Retained earning 0.042 0.108 0.383*** 0.319*** 
 (0.41) (1.25) (3.17) (3.66) 
constant 2.927*** 2.410*** 3.131*** -0.516 
 (7.29) (9.00) (3.14) (-0.85) 
Firm FE Yes  No Yes  No 
Region FE No  Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE No  Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
N 12362 12362 12362 12362 
R-squared 0.2161 0.2930 0.1573 0.3156 
Panel B: Stock dividend as dependent variable 
 Low Q High Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Incentive 0.016 0.009 0.280*** 0.279*** 
 (0.63) (0.43) (2.66) (3.27) 
Incentive*IPI -0.003 -0.000 -0.022** -0.014* 
 (-1.16) (-0.21) (-2.31) (-1.88) 
IPI 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.008** 
 (0.54) (0.26) (-0.14) (2.26) 
Log Assets -0.002 -0.005* -0.072** -0.115*** 
 (-0.33) (-1.96) (-2.53) (-7.45) 
Debt Ratio -0.043 -0.029 -0.310*** -0.213*** 
 (-1.43) (-1.39) (-3.16) (-2.81) 
ROA 0.355*** 0.375*** 1.887*** 2.342*** 
 (5.56) (6.71) (8.08) (11.37) 
SD Return -0.005 -0.003 1.175*** 1.555*** 
 (-0.11) (-0.07) (6.60) (10.22) 
Cash Ratio 0.163*** 0.161*** 1.336*** 1.190*** 
 (4.84) (6.42) (13.01) (14.24) 
Inst % Owned 0.062*** 0.020* 0.715*** 0.451*** 
  (4.51) (1.75) (10.68) (8.36) 
Age  -0.003** -0.004*** -0.041*** -0.046*** 
 (-2.19) (-7.61) (-4.98) (-18.05) 
Retained earning  -0.034 -0.044* 0.016 0.025 
 (-1.00) (-1.73) (0.19) (0.44) 
constant 0.088 0.185*** 1.620*** 2.442*** 
 (0.77) (3.21) (2.81) (7.48) 
Firm FE Yes  No Yes  No 
Region FE No  Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE No  Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
N 12362 12362 12362 12362 
R-squared  0.0638 0.0748 0.1474 0.1600 
t statistics in parentheses; (***, **, and *) indicate 1, 5, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Analysis of Stock Options and Restricted Stock 
Table 7 reports coefficients from OLS regressions in which the ratios of cash and 
stock dividends to total assets are the dependent variables. We use robust standard 
errors clustered by firm, and include region, industry and year fixed effects. IPI 
measures province-level investor protection, based on scores for “market 
intermediaries and legal system/environment”. Stock options are captured with a 
dummy variable set to one for firms using stock option equity incentive schemes, and 
zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1.  
 Cash dividend Stock dividend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Option -0.119* -0.729*** -0.435** -0.061 -0.434 -0.222 
 (-1.73) (-2.76) (-2.46) (-0.94) (-1.27) (-1.32) 
Option*IPI  0.054** 0.030*  0.025 0.015 
  (2.37) (1.92)  (0.86) (1.02) 
IPI  -0.020 -0.041  -0.054 -0.046 
   (-0.54) (-1.20)  (-1.12) (-1.11) 
Log Assets 0.027 0.091 0.031 -0.078** -0.239** -0.075* 
 (0.64) (1.02) (0.72) (-1.96) (-2.07) (-1.89) 
Debt Ratio -0.704*** -0.495 -0.709*** -0.583** -1.296*** -0.585** 
 (-3.09) (-1.60) (-3.11) (-2.50) (-3.26) (-2.51) 
ROA 10.829*** 8.940*** 10.800*** 4.816*** 4.064*** 4.788*** 
 (14.33) (9.86) (14.29) (5.71) (3.48) (5.67) 
SD Return -1.280*** -0.796* -1.274*** 2.500*** 2.021*** 2.518*** 
 (-3.18) (-1.77) (-3.16) (5.28) (3.49) (5.32) 
Cash Ratio 1.329*** 1.275*** 1.307*** 1.396*** 1.964*** 1.378*** 
 (5.75) (4.38) (5.65) (5.71) (5.24) (5.63) 
Inst% Owned 0.412*** 0.231 0.408*** 0.374*** 0.872*** 0.372*** 
 (3.13) (1.44) (3.10) (2.67) (4.20) (2.66) 
Age  -0.023*** -0.077* -0.024*** -0.036*** -0.052 -0.036*** 
 (-2.77) (-1.65) (-2.79) (-5.00) (-0.86) (-5.02) 
Retained earning  1.703*** 1.774*** 1.731*** -0.938** -2.616*** -0.918** 
 (4.49) (2.95) (4.56) (-2.46) (-3.38) (-2.41) 
constant -1.173 -1.470 -0.923 1.969** 6.519** 2.231** 
 (-1.07) (-0.68) (-0.83) (2.03) (2.34) (2.25) 
Firm FE No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  
Region FE Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
N 3241 3241 3241 3241 3241 3241 
R-squared 0.3805 0.3031  0.3814  0.1759 0.0922  0.1764 
t statistics in parentheses; (***, **, and *) indicate 1, 5, and 10% significance levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Analysis of Joint Effects of Incentives and Regional Investor Protection on 
Corporate Performance 
Table 8 reports coefficients from OLS regressions in which ROA and Tobin’s Q ratio 
are the dependent variables. We use robust standard errors clustered by firm and 
include region, industry and year fixed effects. IPI measures province-level investor 
protection, based on scores for “market intermediaries and legal system/environment”. 
All other variables are defined as in Table 1.  
 ROA Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentive 0.011*** 0.029 0.005 0.470*** 0.079 0.298*** 
 (9.96) (0.47) (0.12) (11.60) (0.79) (3.09) 
 Incentive*IPI  0.011* 0.009*  0.020** 0.017* 
  (1.96) (1.80)  (2.14) (1.87) 
IPI  0.003 0.001  -0.003 0.023*** 
  (0.74) (0.17)  (-0.47) (2.77) 
Log Assets 0.003*** 0.048*** 0.020*** -0.621*** -0.824*** -0.622*** 
 (6.83) (3.28) (3.44) (-34.46) (-34.20) (-34.54) 
Debt Ratio -0.069*** -0.716*** -0.269*** -3.416*** -2.787*** -3.415*** 
 (-29.51) (-12.79) (-7.51) (-39.69) (-30.16) (-39.69) 
SD Return 0.034*** 0.169 0.129 6.414*** 6.160*** 6.400*** 
 (6.79) (1.60) (1.43) (37.66) (35.23) (37.57) 
Cash Ratio 0.053*** 0.241*** 0.181*** -0.049 -0.338*** -0.028 
 (19.08) (3.87) (4.08) (-0.50) (-3.29) (-0.29) 
Inst% Owned 0.024*** 0.044 0.050* 0.846*** 1.161*** 0.850*** 
 (14.49) (1.20) (1.88) (14.65) (19.26) (14.73) 
Age  -0.000** -0.006 0.003** 0.032*** 0.195*** 0.032*** 
 (-2.27) (-1.47) (2.47) (8.81) (30.69) (8.70) 
Retained earning  0.070*** -0.171*** -0.050* -2.860*** -2.820*** -2.860*** 
 (37.79) (-3.67) (-1.84) (-40.79) (-36.56) (-40.79) 
constant -0.022** -0.670** -0.346*** 16.063*** 18.832*** 15.984*** 
 (-2.24) (-2.21) (-2.58) (37.54) (37.61) (37.25) 
Firm FE No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  
Region FE Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
N 24724 24724 24724 24724 24724 24724 
R-squared 0.3308 0.0241 0.0690  0.4895   0.2367 0.4902 
 
t statistics in parentheses; (***, **, and *) indicate 1, 5, and 10% significance levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix : 
1. Robust test for table 5, use Payout ratio as the dependent variable 
 Payout ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Incentive 0.227** 0.209*** 0.107** 
 (2.19) (4.25) (2.47) 
Incentive*IPI  -0.015*** -0.013*** 
  (-3.27) (-3.28) 
IPI  -0.007* -0.012*** 
  (-1.86) (-2.90) 
Log Assets 0.188*** 0.108*** 0.189*** 
 (26.28) (9.18) (26.34) 
Debt Ratio -0.271*** -0.247*** -0.271*** 
 (-6.98) (-5.36) (-6.98) 
ROA 3.369*** 2.850*** 3.373*** 
 (31.86) (25.73) (31.91) 
SD Return -1.118*** -0.924*** -1.111*** 
 (-14.00) (-10.77) (-13.92) 
Cash Ratio 0.543*** 0.667*** 0.532*** 
 (12.11) (13.19) (11.87) 
Inst% Owned -0.048* -0.252*** -0.051* 
 (-1.81) (-8.49) (-1.92) 
Age  -0.013*** -0.030*** -0.013*** 
 (-9.75) (-9.64) (-9.67) 
Retained earning 0.013 0.058 0.012 
 (0.42) (1.51) (0.38) 
constant -3.011*** -1.166*** -2.965*** 
 (-18.07) (-4.76) (-17.71) 
Firm FE No  Yes  No  
Region FE Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes 
N 24724 24724 24724 
R-squared  0.2960 0.1673 0.2969  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2. Robust test for table 6 panel A, use Payout ratio as the dependent variable 
 Low Q High Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Incentive 0.250*** 0.139** 0.051 -0.012 
 (3.48) (2.26) (0.94) (-0.27) 
Incentive*IPI -0.016** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.003 
 (-2.32) (-2.78) (-1.12) (-0.79) 
IPI -0.008* 0.005* -0.003 0.001 
 (-1.79) (1.82) (-0.60) (0.62) 
Log Assets 0.111*** 0.184*** 0.060*** 0.118*** 
 (6.55) (19.08) (3.89) (13.53) 
Debt Ratio -0.250*** -0.240*** -0.081* -0.131*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.95) (-1.69) (-3.43) 
ROA 4.611*** 5.375*** 0.937*** 1.652*** 
 (25.60) (31.71) (8.48) (16.58) 
SD Return -1.261*** -1.486*** -0.391*** -0.617*** 
 (-8.82) (-10.88) (-4.80) (-8.85) 
Cash Ratio 0.809*** 0.625*** 0.427*** 0.346*** 
 (9.45) (9.00) (8.75) (8.50) 
Inst % Owned -0.226*** 0.001 -0.137*** 0.003 
 (-5.46) (0.02) (-3.79) (0.09) 
Age  -0.033*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.011*** 
 (-7.95) (-9.46) (-4.18) (-8.03) 
Retained earning 0.308*** 0.307*** 0.093** 0.072*** 
 (3.58) (4.50) (2.48) (2.72) 
constant -1.071*** -2.964*** -0.515* -1.892*** 
 (-3.14) (-14.93) (-1.67) (-10.22) 
Firm FE Yes  No Yes  No 
Region FE No  Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE No  Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
N 12362 12362 12362 12362 
R-squared 0.2210 0.2969 0.1910 0.2804 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. Robust test for table7, use Payout ratio as the dependent variable 
 Payout ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Option -0.004 -0.347** -0.120 
 (-0.10) (-2.55) (-1.20) 
Option*IPI  0.034*** 0.011* 
  (2.92) (1.82) 
IPI  -0.035* -0.034* 
  (-1.85) (-1.94) 
Log Assets 0.299*** 0.335*** 0.302*** 
 (11.52) (6.19) (11.62) 
Debt Ratio -0.293** -0.284* -0.294** 
 (-2.21) (-1.65) (-2.23) 
ROA 4.032*** 3.187*** 4.013*** 
 (8.15) (5.52) (8.11) 
SD Return -0.842*** -0.773*** -0.833*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.34) (-3.93) 
Cash Ratio 0.234* 0.295** 0.219* 
 (1.88) (1.97) (1.75) 
Inst% Owned -0.208*** -0.301*** -0.212*** 
 (-2.93) (-3.64) (-2.99) 
Age  0.009 0.031 0.009 
 (1.64) (1.26) (1.63) 
Retained earning  0.953*** 1.497*** 0.974*** 
 (4.01) (4.05) (4.09) 
constant -6.425*** -7.108*** -6.242*** 
 (-9.37) (-5.49) (-9.04) 
Firm FE No  Yes  No  
Region FE Yes No  Yes 
Industry FE Yes No  Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes 
N 3241 3241 3241 
R-squared 0.3210 0.2550  0.3210  
 
